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Abstract
This study analyzes systematic and non-systematic credit risk in mortgage portfolios
given US loan-level information by controlling for time-varying observable information in
relation to the borrower, the collateral and the macro economy. The total risk in relation to
rating class default rates is decomposed into systematic and class-speciﬁc non-systematic
risk by a state space model. The paper ﬁnds that the total risk relates to credit quality
in a smile-shaped pattern: systematic risk is negatively related and non systematic risk is
positively related to average default rate levels. In addition, total risk increases during and
after the Global Financial Crisis. The impact of the crisis on systematic risk is persistent
whereas the impact on non-systematic risk appears to be temporary. The analysis of reg-
ulatory capital suggests that mortgage risk models in conjunction with periodic updating
warrant a suﬃcient level of regulatory capital given the current regime. These ﬁndings
are relevant to prudential regulators who are currently discussing the implementation of a
monotone relationship between default probabilities and asset correlations under Basel III.
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1 Introduction
In March 2013, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has proposed to increase the 15% Basel
II/III asset correlation for mortgage loans with higher loan-to-value ratios (LTV) (see Irvine,
2013). The proposal includes an asset correlation of 20% for loans with an LTV between 80%
and 90% and an asset correlation of 21% for loans with an LTV in excess of 90%. These
changes aim to reﬂect a higher exposure to systematic risk for high LTV loans.
While this proposal applies to New Zealand, it is an interesting starting point for a global
discussion as (i) in particular high risk loans (e.g., high LTV or sub-prime loans) were exposed
to large credit losses in the US during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and (ii) our knowledge
on the exposure of mortgage loans to systematic risk is limited.
The industry measures the exposure to systematic risk with the concept of asset correla-
tions and the link between asset correlations and default probabilities is controversial. Prior
literature has focused on corporate loans. Grundke (2008) provides an overview of empirical
studies on asset correlations including data sources and estimation methods for corporate ex-
posures and the relationship of correlations to default probabilities and ﬁrm size. Sironi and
Zazzara (2003), Lopez (2004), and Das et al. (2007) ﬁnd that asset correlations decrease with
increasing probabilities of default (PD) and decreasing size of Italian and US corporate loans.
Contrary to this, Dietsch and Petey (2004) ﬁnd a positive relationship of asset correlation and
default probability for European small and medium enterprises. In addition, some papers ex-
plain the time-varying co-movement of defaults based on macroeconomic variables and latent
risk factors (see e.g., Duﬃe et al. (2009) who model latent factors conditional on observable
macroeconomic information, i.e., frailty). Demchuk and Gibson (2006) use exclusively macroe-
conomic variables for modeling US corporate default rates. Koopman et al. (2011) use latent
risk factors and macroeconomic variables explaining US corporate default rates.
Empirical evidence on systematic risk of mortgage loans is limited. Most research has fo-
cused on the prediction of mortgage defaults and loss rates using borrower, loan and macroe-
conomic characteristics. For instance, Elul et al. (2010) and Goodman et al. (2010) investigate
the impact of negative equity, illiquidity and unemployment on predicting mortgage default.
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Amromin and Paulson (2009) evaluate the relative impact of borrower, loan and macroeco-
nomic characteristics on mortgage defaults and identify real estate prices as an important risk
driver. Rajan et al. (2013) show that the deterioration of the accuracy of statistical default
prediction model is triggered by the change in lender behavior as the level of securitization in-
creases. Crook and Banasik (2012) forecast mortage default rates based on the mortgage rate
and the real house price index. Cowan and Cowan (2004) model the variance of default events
for bank-internal credit scores, FICO scores and other mortgage information. Jimenez and
Mencia (2009) propose a state space model linking the default rates with both macroeconomic
variables and a frailty risk factor for retail loans.
The contributions of this paper relative to the literature are as follows. Firstly, we fo-
cus on mortgage default which is an important credit exposure class with limited research
on systematic risk. The paper provides a multivariate predictive model for mortgage default
probabilities by incorporating signiﬁcant time-varying loan, borrower level as well as macroe-
conomic information. Scores provided by Fair Isaac and Co. (FICO), current LTV ratios and
debt-to-income ratios are most predictive. We are ﬁrst in kind to control for real estate prices
by computing the current LTV ratio (CLTV). Prior studies are based on LTV at origination.
We analyze the in-sample and out-of-time prediction quality of this predictive model for mort-
gage default. Secondly, our paper is ﬁrst to measure total mortgage risk and decompose the
total risk into systematic and non-systematic class-speciﬁc risk by controlling for the credit
quality (i.e., the default threshold). The structural single factor model underlying the Basel
framework is extended via a state space model with multiple risk factors and associated pa-
rameters estimated by the maximum likelihood method with Kalman ﬁltering. The resulting
parameter estimates may provide benchmark values for regulatory input parameters. The
paper extends Cowan and Cowan (2004) who focus on the variance of default events which
endogenously co-moves with credit quality but do not measure systematic risk conditional on
the credit quality. The paper also builds on the paper by Jimenez and Mencia (2009) which
analyzes macroeconomic time series information but does not control for mortgage-speciﬁc
information, as well as interaction between such information and the economy (e.g., CLTV)
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and the clustering of risk with regard to the credit quality. The decomposition of total risk
into systematic and non-systematic risk is important as some banks are able to diversify the
non-systematic risk of diﬀerent classes while others are not able to diversify due to ineﬃcient
lending markets. Banks often have a business model that concentrates on lending to a partic-
ular risk segment such as prime or sub-prime loans, primary lending or reﬁnancing. Thirdly,
our study extends the literature in relation to the econometric framework as multiple latent
variables are included in a model and auto correlations are modeled through ﬁrst order auto
regressive processes. This allows banks to quantify past realizations of systematic risk and
include these into their predictory mortgage models. Fourthly, the paper analyzes the time
series properties for all parameters and pre-crisis as well as crisis information.
The study is important as mortgage loans are the largest asset class in commercial banking
and losses in relation to mortgage loans have triggered the failure of a large number of ﬁnancial
institutions in recent years. The understanding of the exposure to systematic and to non-
systematic risks is central to the eﬃcient allocation of capital in relation to minimum reserve
and capital requirements. Our study is based on a large loan-level data set on US sub-prime
mortgage loans.
The paper's ﬁndings are as follows. Firstly, a mortgage's total risk relates to the probability
of default in a smile-shaped pattern: the total risk ﬁrst decreases and then increases with
increasing unconditional default risk.. Note that the large changes in mortgage default rates
which were observed during the GFC do not necessarily imply high exposures to systematic
risk. This is due to the dependence of the default rate volatility on both the unconditional
probability of default and systematic risk as shown in Gordy (2000). However, the argument
holds for given unconditional PD level, which is why we analyze systematic risk and non-
systematic risk by controlling for credit quality. Secondly, systematic risk increases as the
credit rating of mortgage decreases, while non-systematic risk decreases as the credit rating of
mortgage decreases. Lower rated mortgages are more sensitive to systematic risk than higher
rated mortgages. Thirdly, total risk increases during and after the GFC. However, the increase
of total risk results from non-systematic risk for the lowest risk class and from systematic risk
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for the remainder of the risk classes. Fourthly, the impact of systematic risk is persistent
whereas the impact on non-systematic risk is temporary. Finally, the regulatory capital given
the current asset correlation regime of 15% is found to be suﬃcient for all risk classes and all
observation periods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a methodological
approach to measure PD, systematic risk and non-systematic risks and their relationship.
Section 3 introduces the data and provides descriptive statistics for mortgagee, mortgage
collateral and economic characteristics and presents estimation results and empirical ﬁndings.
PDs are estimated via a point-in-time Probit model using information available at origination
and observation times for mortgages. Information relates to mortgagees, collateral and the
economy. Point-in-time models consider time-varying information, since default probabilities
change with the state of the economy.1 Consistent with current industry practice, rating
classes are assigned based on the estimated probabilities of default (or alternatively credit
scores). Then the rating class-level historical default rates are simultaneously modeled by
a state space model with multiple risk factors: systematic and class-speciﬁc risk factors for
investigating systematic and non-systematic risks for mortgage exposures. Consistent with
the data, all risk factors are assumed to be autoregressively correlated to capture the time
dependence of historical default rates. The state space model is estimated for various time
periods to examine the serial change of unconditional PD, systematic and non-systematic
risks. Section 4 calculates the regulatory capital given the PD estimates and investigates the
adequacy of regulatory capital for mortgage portfolios under the current regime and model-
implied as well as data-implied exposures to total risk. Finally, Section 5 concludes and
discusses implications for prudential regulation.
2 Methodology
The methodological procedure of this study is as follows. Section 2.1 estimates individual PDs
of mortgages via a Probit model incorporating various borrower, loan, collateral and macroe-
1Compare Loeer (2004) for a comparison of default probability models.
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conomic characteristics for diﬀerent estimation periods. Section 2.2 explains the categorization
of mortgage loans into ten risk classes based on the estimated PDs. In Section 2.3, the condi-
tional PD is derived for autoregressively correlated risk factors. Section 2.4 establishes a state
space model with multiple latent risk factors for estimating class-wide PDs, systematic risks
and non-systematic risks.
2.1 Mortgagee default process and unconditional probability of default
Based on the theory of Merton (1974), a mortgage borrower defaults on a loan when the latent
asset value falls below the nominal amount of debt at maturity (the default threshold). We
follow the contributions by Gordy (2000, 2003) and Vasicek (1991, 1987) and assume that
idiosyncratic risk is fully diversiﬁed in a bank portfolio which is inﬁnitely granular.2
The asset return of mortgage borrower i (i = 1, ..., I) in period t (t = 1, ..., T ) is driven
by a common time-speciﬁc systematic risk factor Ft and an idiosyncratic (i.e., diversiﬁable)
factor i,t:
Vi,t =
√
ρiFt +
√
1− ρii,t, (1)
where Ft and i,t are standard normally distributed and independent from each other, with
standardized weights
√
ρi and
√
1− ρi with values between zero and one.3 Note that ρi is the
exposure to systematic risk and known as the asset return correlation in the literature.
A default event occurs when and if the asset return Vi,t on assets falls below threshold
hi,t−1:
Vi,t < hi,t−1 (2)
with hi,t−1 = βxi,t−1, where xi,t−1 = (x1i,t−1, x
2
i,t−1, ..., x
p
i,t−1)
′ is a information on the mortgage
borrower, the mortgage loan, the loan collateral and the economy which is observable in time
2This model is consistent with the model for determining regulatory capital of banks applied in the Basel
II and III regulation.
3Please note that a non-linear transformation of Vi,t ensures that distributions of risk measures such as
probability of default, default rate or loss rate are highly skewed. In other words, the propensity of large losses
is much greater than a normal distribution would suggest.
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t and before. β is a vector of the respective sensitivities.
The borrower default is modeled by the indicator
Dit =

1 borrower i defaults in period t
0 otherwise.
(3)
The unconditional default probability of the borrower is given by:
P(Di,t = 1) = P(Vi,t < hit−1) = Φ(hi,t−1) = Φ(βxi,t−1). (4)
2.2 Borrower categorization
It is econometrically challenging to estimate the exposure to systematic risk (ρi) on a borrower
level due to (i) the unavailability of loan-level borrower asset values and (ii) the binary char-
acter of the dependent default variable. Like corporate borrowers, mortgagee asset values are
unknown to the ﬁnancial institution. Therefore, we categorize the borrowers into risk classes
and estimate the exposure to systematic risk in a second step. Once the unconditional PD is
estimated by the Probit model in Equation (4), mortgages are split into G risk classes. The
smaller the index of a risk class, the lower the default probability. Mortgages in a given risk
class are assumed to be homogeneous in terms of unconditional PD and their exposures to
systematic and non-systematic risks.
2.3 Class level conditional probability of default
For an assigned mortgage borrower i in risk class g, the asset value return at time t is extended
to a class-speciﬁc non-systematic risk component and an idiosyncratic error term:
Vi,g,t =
√
ρgFt +
√
1− ρg
(√
αgZg,t,+
√
1− αgi,t
)
, (5)
where ρg is a mortgage borrower i's systematic sensitivity to a systematic risk factor Ft and αg
is the factor loading to a class-speciﬁc risk factor Zg,t. Both parameters are deﬁned between
zero and one. Note that parameter sensitivity to the systematic risk factor is now group-
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speciﬁc, i.e.,
√
ρg. The idiosyncratic factor i,t ∼ N (0, 1) is independent from Ft and Zg,t. All
risk factors are assumed to be unobservable and their unconditional distributions are supposed
to be standard normal. These assumptions are common in the credit risk models since the
introduction of CreditMetrics (2007) and consistent with the model assumption in current
prudential regulation as shown in McNeil et al. (2005) and Lando (2003). Suppose that V˜i,g,t
and h˜g are the unknown true asset return and default threshold of mortgage i in risk class g at
time t, respectively. McNeil et al. (2005) show that the two threshold models (Vi,g,t, hg) and
(V˜i,g,t, h˜g) are equivalent if the default probabilities coincide, i.e. P(Vi,g,t ≤ hg) = P(V˜i,g,t ≤
h˜g), and if the two asset returns have the same multivariate dependence structure between
mortgages (multivariate normal herein). Note that if αg = 0 then ρg represents the pairwise
asset correlation of the asset value return process of two borrowers in class g which is consistent
with the exposure to a single systematic risk factor underlying the Basel framework.
For the asset return process in Equation (5), the total risk of a mortgage borrower can
be represented as the additive sum of systematic risk, class-speciﬁc non-systematic risk and
idiosyncratic risk:
σg = var (Vi,g,t)
= ρg︸︷︷︸
systematic risk
+ (1− ρg)αg︸ ︷︷ ︸
non−systematic risk
+ (1− ρg) (1− αg)︸ ︷︷ ︸
idiosyncratic risk
= 1.
Mortgage credit portfolios consist of large numbers of loans with almost equal weights (given
the same vintage). Therefore idiosyncratic risk (1− ρg) (1− αg)is diversiﬁed away in such
portfolios. Thus, the total risk (σg) of risk class is simply composed of systematic risk (ρg)
and non-systematic risk (α˜g):
σg = ρg + α˜g ≤ 1, (6)
where α˜g = (1− ρg)αg. The asset correlation between two borrowers i and j within the same
risk class is equal to the total risk since
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corr (Vi,g,t, Vj,g,t) = ρg + (1− ρg)αg.
The asset correlation between two borrowers i and j in diﬀerent risk classes is
corr
(
Vi,g,t, Vj,g′,t
)
= ρgρg′ .
We denote Di,g,t as the default indicator for mortgage i at time t, taking either zero or one
for a default threshold hg,t−1, i.e.,
Di,g,t =
 0,1,
if Vi,g,t ≤ hg,t−1
otherwise.
(7)
Then the unconditional PD of risk class g is
P (Vi,g,t ≤ hg,t−1) = Φ (hg,t−1) ,
where Φ (·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Note that the default is
now class-speciﬁc due to our homogeneity assumption.
Conditional on Ft = ft and Zg,t = zg,t, the PD of mortgage i in the risk class g at time t
is given by
pg (ft, zg,t) = P [Vi,g,t ≤ hg,t−1 |ft, zg,t ]
= Φ
(
Φ−1 (pg)√
1− ρg
√
1− αg
−
√
ρg√
1− ρg
√
1− αg
ft −
√
αg√
1− αg
zg,t
)
, (8)
where pg is a class-wide unconditional PD of mortgages in the risk class g satisfying pg =
Φ (hg,t−1).
Given the total number of mortgages in the risk class g, Ng,t, the default rate of the risk
class g at time t is
9
rg,Ng,t =
∑Ng,t
i=1 Di,g,t
Ng,t
. (9)
The default rate rg,Ng,t converges to the conditional default probability pg (ft, zt) as Ng,t
increases to inﬁnity tby the law of large numbers, i.e.,
rg,t = lim
Ng,t→∞
rg,Ng,t → pg (ft, zg,t) .
Then the default rate is
rg,t = Φ
(
Φ−1 (pg)√
1− ρg
√
1− αg
−
√
ρg√
1− ρg
√
1− αg
ft −
√
αg√
1− αg
zg,t
)
. (10)
For the time dependence of the default rates, we assume an AR(1) process for the systematic
and class-speciﬁc risk factors:
ft = βfft−1 +
√
1− β2fνf,t (11)
zg,t = βgzg,t−1 +
√
1− β2gνg,t, (12)
where −1 < βf < 1, −1 < βg < 1, νf,t ∼ N(0, 1) and νg,t ∼ N(0, 1) for all g = 1, 2, · · · , G.
Note that the unconditional mean and variance of the systematic and class-speciﬁc risk factors
are zero and one, respectively.
2.4 State space model for default rate
The conditional default rate in Equation (10) can be re-parametrized as the Measurement
Equation for linearity and simplicity:
Φ−1 (rg,t) = φ0,g + φ1,gft + φ2,gzg,t (13)
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for all g = 1, 2, · · · , G, where φ0,g = Φ
−1(pg)√
1−ρg
√
1−αg , φ1,g = −
√
ρg√
1−ρg
√
1−αg and φ2,g = −
√
αg√
1−αg .
The State Equation is constructed by the systematic and class-speciﬁc risk factors as
ξt = Fξt−1 + νt, (14)
where ξt = (ft, z1,t, z2,t, · · · , zG,t)′, F is the diagonal matrix of the auto regressive coeﬃcients
in Equation (11) and Equation (12), i.e., F = diag (βf , β1, β2, · · · , βG), and the vector νt =
(νf,t, ν1,t, ν2,t, · · · , νG,t)′ is a white noise vector such that
E
(
νtν
′
τ
)
=

Q for t = τ
0 otherwise.
In the above, Q = IG+1−F 2 and IG+1 is the ((G+ 1)× (G+ 1)) identity matrix. Note that
there is no measurement error in the Measurement Equation (13) since we assume that every
risk class includes a large enough number of homogeneous mortgages.4 The state space model
for default rate with the Measurement Equation (13) and the State Equation in (14) can be
generally estimated by maximum likelihood estimation with Kalman ﬁltering (see Hamilton
(1994) for details).
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
The paper is based on loan level data on US securitized non-agency mortgage loans. The data
was collected from monthly loan tapes for residential mortgage-backed securities by Interna-
tional Financial Research and matches the data from Rajan et al. (2013), who show that up
to 90% of all US sub-prime mortgage loans are securitized.
The data set comprises 4,978,076 loans observed at quarterly intervals from 2000 to 2012.
4In the empirical analysis, a state space model with measurement errors was also applied as a robustness
check. The estimated variance of the measurement errors has no eﬀect on the estimates of other parameters,
although we do not present the outcomes in the paper. Thus, measurement error terms are not further
discussed. The empirical results are available upon request.
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We record 1,143,228 loan foreclosure events (many during the GFC in 2007 and thereafter).
The total number of loan-quarter observations is 56,946,616. We deﬁne the default event as
loan foreclosure. Observations with missing values in key variables were omitted from the
analysis.
Table 1 summarizes the number of observations per origination and observation year.
Consistent with Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) origination years immediately prior to the
GFC and observation years during the GFC have a larger proportion of default events.
[Table 1 about here.]
Figure 1 plots the quarter-by-quarter total default rates from 2000 to 2012. The ﬁgure
shows the default rate and average loss rate given default over time. The eﬀect of the sub-
prime crisis is extremely strong as the default rate increases during the crisis from 0.52% at
2004:Q2 to 3.90% at 2009:Q2. The grey bars indicate quarters which include a period of
economic downturn as indicated by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Loss rates given default (LGDs) are recorded at default for individual mortgages.5 The
aggregated loss ratio given default in Figure 1 is calculated as the ratio of all losses over a
given quarter to the outstanding account balance at the time of default for the quarter. The
gap between the two lines is proportional to the recovery. The default rates and loss rates
given default increase during economic downturns.
Mortgage information at origination
Mortgage-speciﬁc variables at origination include origination year (OY), ARM indica-
tor (ARM), FICO score (FICO), original balance, original appraisal value of the collat-
eral/property (OAV), original loan-to-value ratio,owner occupancy type (OWNOCCP) and
dwelling type (DWLTYPE).
Table 2 and Table 3 describe these variables for default and non default observations.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
The FICO score measures the credit worthiness of a borrower using information from
5Section 4 includes LGDs in the computation of Basel capital and implied capital.
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borrower credit ﬁles. A higher FICO score implies a higher credit quality. The average FICO
score of defaulted mortgages is 30 points lower than for non-defaulted mortgages. The average
original balance is 3.6% larger for defaulted than for non-defaulted mortgages. The mean of
appraisal values of the collateral (i.e., the ﬁnanced real estate) is $40,000 smaller for defaulted
mortgages than for non-defaulted mortgage. The mean of original LTV ratio is 8% higher
for defaulted mortgages than non-defaulted mortgages. The ARM indicator denotes whether
or not a mortgage rate may be adjusted after it is issued. Generally speaking, the mortgage
rate is linked to a reference rate such as LIBOR for adjustable rate mortgages. We assign a
code of 1 to adjustable rate mortgages and a code of 0 to ﬁxed rate mortgages. The default
rate of adjustable rate mortgages is 1.7% higher than for ﬁxed rate mortgages in Table 3.
The purpose of owner occupancy is classiﬁed into three types: residence (code=1), investment
(code=2), and others (code=0). The code for residence includes both primary and secondary
residence, the code for others contains tenant, vacant and unknown. Mortgages for residence
and investment are 0.6% less risky in terms of the default rate than mortgages for other
purposes. Dwelling type includes single family homes (code=1), planned urban developments
(code=2), and condominiums (code=3), and others (code=0). Mortgages for planned urban
developments and condominiums are 0.1% riskier than other purposes in terms of the default
rate.
Mortgage information at observation time
Mortgage-level variables at observation time t are current balance (CB), and current loan-
to-value ratio (CLTV). The current balance of defaulted mortgages is on average $27,000 larger
than non-defaulted mortgages.
The current loan-to-value ratio of mortgages is calculated using the Case-Shiller Index for
20 major metropolitan statistical areas in the US as follows. We ﬁrst compute the distance
of individual mortgage properties to 20 US cities for which a Case-Shiller home price index
is available (via a mortgage's property zip-code). If a zip-code is not available, then we use
the zip code of the largest city in the state of the property in terms of population. Then,
we select the closest Case-Shiller index for a mortgage property and approximate the current
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loan-to-value ratio at observation time t as
CLTVi,t =
CBi,t
CAVi,t
.
The current appraisal value (CAV) is modeled by the following approximation:
CAVi,t = OAVi · CSIi,t
CSIi,t0
,
where CSIi,t0 and CSIi,t denote the Case-Shiller Index at the origination time t0 and the
observation time t, respectively. For mortgages where the property zip code and state are
unavailable, we use the 10-city composite Case-Shiller Index (CSI).6 Figure 2 plots the CSI and
shows the spectacular decline during the GFC. CLTV is 27% higher for defaulted mortgages
than for non-defaulted mortgages in Table 2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Macro economic information
Next to the Case-Shiller indices, we use the country-level debt-to-income ratio (DTI) from
the Federal Reserve Bank. DTI is an estimate of the ratio of debt payments to disposable
personal income. Debt payments consist of the estimated required payments on outstanding
mortgage and consumer debt. We chose DTI as it is common in banking and reﬂects economic
information such as growth as well as employment levels. Figure 2 shows the quarterly reported
country-level DTI which is correlated with the level of default rate in Figure 1.
3.2 Probit model
Based on the literature, we tested a wide range of mortgage variables and included the follow-
ing variables in the Probit model: CLTV (positive eﬀect from Amromin and Paulson (2009),
Elul et al. (2010) and Goodman et al. (2010)), ARM (positive eﬀect from Amromin and
Paulson (2009)), DWLTYPE (mixed eﬀect from Elul et al. (2010) and Foote et al. (2008))
and OWNOCCP (mixed eﬀect from Amromin and Paulson (2009)) for loan characteristics and
6We use the 10-city composite Case-Shiller Index rather than the 20-city composite Case-Shiller Index as
the latter is only available for years after 2000.
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FICO score (negative eﬀect from Elul et al. (2010)) for borrower characteristics, and DTI (pos-
itive eﬀect from Amromin and Paulson (2009) and Goodman et al. (2010)) for macroeconomic
characteristics.
Furthermore, we include dummy variables for the mortgage origination year which capture
vintage eﬀect and year-speciﬁc economic and market conditions. Demyanyk and Hemert (2011)
show that mortgage loans which were originated just before the GFC have higher default rates
than loans originated in earlier years.
Table 4 presents the results from the point-in-time Probit model for the various estimation
periods from 2000:Q2 to 2006:Q4 for the ﬁrst model to 2000 (Q2) to 2012 (Q4) for the last
model.
[Table 4 about here.]
Our results in Table 4 are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in the literature. Most
prominently, PDs increase with CLTV and DTI and decrease with FICO score. The marginal
eﬀect of those variables on actual default is highly signiﬁcant over time. PDs also vary with
dwelling and owner occupancy types. As expected, investment mortgage loans are riskier than
residential mortgage loans and single family mortgages are less risky than others.
The goodness-of-ﬁt statistics (Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve
(AUROC), R2 and pseudo R2) generally decrease as the estimation time horizon expands
towards 2012. This decline in accuracy of the Probit model is consistent with the ﬁnding by
Rajan et al. (2013) who ﬁnd that default prediction errors increase over time and hypothesize
that this is due to the degree of securitization on mortgages and lending standards. In addition,
the trend persists after the GFC. Note that other explanations such as population changes in
terms of number of mortgages or risk characteristics are also plausible.
The measure AUROC is based on the area under receiver operating characteristic curve
(ROC). ROC curves are a common performance measure for ordinal rating systems. Figure 3
displays the true positives rate on the y-axis (sensitivity, which measures how well the model
identiﬁes default) and the false positives rate on the x-axis (one minus the speciﬁcity, which
measures how well a model identiﬁes non-default).
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[Figure 3 about here.]
The better a ranking/rating system is able to attribute non-impairment outcomes with
lower ranks and impairment outcomes with higher ranks, the larger the area under the ROC
curve is (AUROC, see Agresti, 1984). The areas under the ROC curve are reported in Table
7 for the estimation and the prediction years.
These measures are common in the literature and can also be transformed into Gini coeﬃ-
cients and therefore be expressed as cumulative impairment frequencies for ratings, which are
sorted from high to low risk classes (compare, e.g., Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and
Jarrow (2004)).
3.3 Default rates of risk classes
Based on the PD estimates from the Probit model, we construct ten risk classes with a width
of 30 basis points for the ﬁrst nine classes. Thus mortgages with PDs between 0 and 0.3%
are assigned to the ﬁrst class while mortgages with PDs greater than 2.7% are assigned to the
tenth (i.e., the last) class.
The PD boundaries are selected to ensure that all classes have large observation and default
numbers. We calculate the actual default rate for the risk class g at time t as in Equation (9)
for all classes.
Figure 4(a) plots the quarter-by-quarter default rates by risk class at the last estimation
time horizon, i.e., from 2000:Q2 to 2012:Q4.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4(a) shows that riskier classes have higher default rate levels with higher volatilities
over the entire time horizon. During the sub-prime crisis, default rates rise and absolute change
rates are monotone in unconditional PD levels and therefore risk classes. This observation may
imply that mortgages with higher PD are more vulnerable to external economic shocks and
thereby more sensitive to the systematic risk, than mortgages with lower PDs. This is the
working hypothesis for our study.
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3.4 Results of state space model
The parameters of the state space model with the Measurement Equation (13) and the State
Equation (14) are estimated by the maximum likelihood method with Kalman ﬁltering. The
original parameters are computed by reversing the re-parametrization in relation to the Mea-
surement Equation (13). Standard errors are calculated based on the delta method.
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of the state space model for the last estimation
period from 2000 to 2012. Most of the parameters are highly signiﬁcant. In Panel A, φ0,g
indicates the unconditional mean of the Measurement Equation and is proportional to the
default threshold for risk class g. As expected, the default threshold increases as the credit
quality decreases from class 1 to class 10. The parameter φ1,g relates to the sensitivity of
class-wide default to the systematic risk factor ft. The worse the rating class, the higher the
sensitivity to the systematic risk factor. The estimates of φ2,g show that the worse the rating
class, the less the sensitivity to the class-speciﬁc risk factor. These ﬁndings imply that the
better rating classes are more exposed to the class-speciﬁc risk and the worse rating classes are
more exposed to economic downturns due to their high sensitivity to the systematic risk factor.
The estimated auto regressive parameters for the risk factors in Panel B provide evidence
for a strong time dependence of risk factors and thereby, the auto regressive dependence of
systematic risk realizations.
3.4.1 Unconditional PD and total risk
The parameters of asset value returns in Equation (5) are calculated in Table 6 by applying
the associated re-parametrization in the Measurement Equation (13) given the estimates of
state space model in Panel A of Table 5. The unconditional PD (pg) and the systematic risk
measure (ρg) monotonically increase as the credit qualities of risk classes deteriorate, while
the total risk (σg) and the non-systematic risk (αg and α˜g) decline with the unconditional PD.
[Table 6 about here.]
For validation of our results, the estimated unconditional PD, the total risk and the sys-
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tematic risk from the single risk factor model in Vasicek (2002) are compared. Vasicek (2002)
is equivalent to our model with αg = 0 for all g in Equation (5), i.e.,
Vi,g,t =
√
ρ˜gFt +
√
1− ρ˜gi,t, (15)
where the systematic risk factor Ft and idiosyncratic factor i,t follow independent standard
normal distributions. Note that there is no class-speciﬁc risk and that the idiosyncratic risk
should be diversiﬁed away for homogeneous portfolios in Equation (15). As such, the total
risk is the same as the systematic risk, i.e. σg = ρ˜g for the single factor model.
Figure 5 shows the total risk and the historical average of default rate of the ten risk
classes.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The total risk of the state space model and the Vasicek model decrease as the credit
qualities of risk classes deteriorate. On the other hand, Figure 4(a) presents that the worse
rated classes experienced more volatile default rates than the better rated classes. Note that
the volatility of defaults depends on both the unconditional PD (pg) and the total risk (ρ˜g)
under the single factor model in Equation (15) as shown in Gordy (2000),7 i.e.,
var (pg (ft) |pg, ρ˜g ) = Φ2
(
Φ−1 (pg) ,Φ−1 (pg) ; ρ˜g
)− p2g, (16)
where Φ2 (·, ·; ρ˜) is the cumulative density function of the bi-variate normal distribution with
the correlation ρ˜g which is the total risk or asset correlation of the risk class g and pg is the
unconditional default probability.
Cowan and Cowan (2004) model the variance of the conditional default probability, or
alternatively the variance of the default rate or number of defaults. Note that this measure
generally depends on the systematic risk and the level of credit quality. Figure 6 plots the
estimated default rate volatility of the state space model and Vasicek model obtained by
Equation (16) against the historical average of default rate of the risk classes. The volatility
of the default rate depends on both systematic risk and the level of the credit quality, i.e. the
7Note that systematic risk (ρ˜g) and total risk (σg) are the same in a single factor model as mentioned earlier.
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unconditional probability of default. The volatility increases as the credit quality of the risk
class decreases while the total risk decreases as the credit quality of the risk class decreases.
The high volatility of high risk classes is related to the unconditional PD rather than to the
total risk. The total risk plays a relatively larger role for the volatility of the default rate for
the low risk classes which have small PDs but high total risk.
[Figure 6 about here.]
3.4.2 Systematic and non-systematic risks
Figure 7 plots the estimated systematic and non-systematic risks against the average of default
rate for the ten risk classes. The term non-systematic risk implies that banks are able to
diversify this risk in eﬃcient lending markets. However, banks often have a business model
that concentrates on lending to a particular risk segment (and therefore unconditional PD
levels) such as prime or sub-prime loans, primary lending or reﬁnancing. Such business models
may imply that banks ﬁnd it diﬃcult to diversify their loan portfolios across risk classes and
the class level non-systematic risk may actually be interpreted as a systematic risk for such
banks. Figure 7 shows that the systematic risk increases and the non-systematic risk decreases
when the credit quality of risk class deteriorates.
[Figure 7 about here.]
These observations suggest that the simultaneous inﬂuence of mortgage characteristics and
systematic risk is not additive due to the interactions between them. In other words, the eﬀect
of systematic risk on default diﬀers depending on the unconditional PD, i.e., the risk class.
Economic downturns may increase unconditional PDs and therefore the exposure to systematic
risk. This may in turn result in a fortiﬁcation of the conditional PDs.
Figure 5 presents the decreasing relationship between systematic risk and the historical
average of class-wide unconditional PDs according to the risk classes under the single fac-
tor model. The single factor ignores the class-speciﬁc behavior of default rate for mortgage
exposures and may result in a misleading interpretation.
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3.4.3 Serial change of risks during the GFC and thereafter
Consistent with this paper, Dietsch and Petey (2004) discuss the eﬀect of the length of the
time series of data on estimated asset correlations. They point out that historical data should
cover at least one complete cycle of the economy in order to avoid a downward estimation bias
of asset correlation. In addition, Lucas (1995) suggests that estimated asset correlations over
short estimation horizons are generally low since defaults may occur due to idiosyncratic risk.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 8 plots the estimated unconditional PD and total risk per estimation period. Figure
8(a) shows that the eﬀect of estimation time horizon is much stronger on the estimation of
total risk than the expected loss (the unconditional PD). Thus, the length of estimation time
horizon is more important for estimating risk measures. These results are consistent with
Lucas (1995) and Dietsch and Petey (2004).
[Figure 9 about here.]
Figure 9 shows the evolution of systematic and non-systematic risks of ten risk classes per
estimation period. During the crisis, the systematic risk gradually increases across all risk
classes except the lowest risk class.
The non-systematic risk also increases during the crisis but reverts to lower levels except
for the lowest risk class. Figure 8(b) implies that total risk increases due to the crisis and
stays at a high level thereafter for all risk classes. Thus, these observations impliy that the
increase of total risk stems from both systematic and non-systematic risks during the crisis
and to a larger degree from systematic risk after the crisis.
3.5 Robustness checks
3.5.1 Prediction accuracy of the Probit model
This paper has used the results from the Probit models as a basis to measure unconditional
risk with regard to systematic and non-systematic risk. The model has been assessed in terms
of in-sample ﬁt statistics (see Table 4). We predict the PD of mortgages at the prediction
year by providing the Probit model at the estimation time with changed borrower and loan
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characteristics of mortgages at a prediction year to assess the model accuracy out-of-time. We
then calculate the AUROC.
Table 7 presents these out-of time AUROCs for diﬀerent combinations of estimation and
prediction years.
[Table 7 about here.]
Like the in-sample AUROC in Table 4, Table 7 is consistent with Rajan et al. (2013) who
point out the deterioration of accuracy of a default prediction model over time as securitization
of mortgage increases. Our default prediction model extends Rajan et al. (2013) by incorpo-
rating additional mortgage characteristics into their default prediction model, which analyses
FICO scores and LTVs. In addition, our paper relates to an extended post-crisis observation
period.
Figure 10 compares the state space model-implied unconditional PDs with the realized
default rates per risk class and model. The lower the total risk of a class, the closer to the
scatters to the diagonal, which implies that default rate predictions are closer to default rate
realizations.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Both the systematic and unsystematic risk are modeled by AR(1) processes to account for
the intrinsic auto correlation. Figure 11 shows the conditional PDs, conditional on the time-
lagged and the contemporary error terms for forecasting at 2008:Q1. Controlling for these
random terms, the ﬁt relative to the diagonal improves considerably. The conditional PDs
are identical to the diagonal if both time-lagged and contemporary error terms are included.
In other words, the predictive quality of the default probability model increases if the auto
regressive structure of the systematic and non-systematic risk factors are taken into account
when estimating the conditional probability of default. The unconditional model in 2008:Q1
deviate to a larger degree from the diagonal than the model conditional on the realization of
the time lagged systematic and non-systematic risk factors: The maximum absolute deviation
for the unconditional 2008 model is 2.19% for class 10. The maximum absolute deviation for
the 2008 model conditional on the realization of the time lagged systematic and non-systematic
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risk factors is 1.35% for class 10.
[Figure 11 about here.]
3.5.2 Risk classiﬁcation
We checked the impact of class boundaries and widths and therefore diﬀerent observations
and default numbers on the empirical results. The systematic risk factor (ft) and class-speciﬁc
risk factors (zg,t) are induced by equally-weighted default rates of ten risk classes in the state
space model. Thus, we test our empirical outcomes for an alternative risk classiﬁcation with
an equal number of mortgages in every risk class, i.e.,
∑T
t=1Ng,t = N for all g. The results of
this alternative risk classiﬁcation are in essence the same and are available upon request.
4 Implication on regulatory capital
This section assesses the capital adequacy of the current regulatory regime and a regime which
takes into account asset correlations based on our (lower) measures of total risk. As we measure
default risk on a quarterly basis these sensitivities are not directly comparable to the Basel
asset correlations and we proceed as follows:
Basel capital
We use the Probit model from the previous section to analyze the adequacy of regulatory
capital by forecasting the default probabilities of future periods. We predict PDs for future
periods one year ahead. In other words, we apply the latest Probit model for a period and
apply future borrower, loan and macroeconomic information.8 The annual PD is inserted into
the formula of the Basel Internal Ratings-Based approach. The regulatory capital requirement
for mortgage i at time t over a year risk horizon can be calculated by
Ci,t = EADi,t · LGDg,t ·
Φ
Φ−1
(
pAi,t
)
+
√
ρBaselΦ
−1 (0.999)
√
1− ρBasel
− pAi,t
 ,
8Note that for the quarters prior to 2006, the 2006 model is applied in-sample.
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where EADi,t is the exposure-at-default, which is equal to variable CB, LGDg,t is the downturn
LGD of class g. According to Basel (2006), the downturn LGD at time t is calculated as the
maximum of the exposure-weighted average loss rate given default during the estimation period
subject to a Basel ﬂoor of 10%. pAi,t is the annualized unconditional PD of mortgage i at time
t, respectively and ρBasel is given as 15%. Then the regulatory capital ratio for the risk class
g at time t over a year risk horizon is:
Cg,t =
∑Ng,t
i=1 Ci,t∑Ng,t
i=1 EADi,t
. (17)
Implied capital - unconditional PD
For mortgage i in the risk class g, the implied capital based on the predicted PD (pi,t) and
the estimated total risk (σg) is obtained by
C˜i,t = EADi,t · LGDg,t · 4 ·
{
Φ
[
Φ−1 (pi,t) +
√
σgΦ
−1 (0.999)√
1− σg
]
− pi,t
}
,
where the conditional PD is multiplied by the annualizing factor 4 since pi,t and σg are on a
quarterly basis.
The implied capital ratio for the risk class g at time t over a year risk horizon is:
C˜g,t =
∑Ng,t
i=1 C˜i,t∑Ng,t
i=1 EADi,t
. (18)
Implied capital - conditional forecast PD
Conditional on ft−1 and zg,t−1, the implied capital based on the forecast PD and the estimated
systematic risk exposures (ρg) and non-systematic risk exposures (αg) is obtained by
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Cˆi,t = EADi,t · LGDg,t · 4 ·
{
Φ
[
Φ−1 (pi,t)√
1− ρg
√
1− αg
−
√
ρg√
1− ρg
√
1− αg
βfft−1
−
√
αg√
1− αg
βgzg,t−1 +
√
σ˜gΦ
−1 (0.999)
]
− pi,t
}
,
where
σ˜g =
ρg
(
1− β2f
)
+ αg (1− ρg)
(
1− β2g
)
(1− ρg) (1− αg)
and the conditional forecast of PD is multiplied by the annualizing factor 4 since the parameters
are on a quarterly basis.
The implied capital ratio for the risk class g at time t over a year risk horizon is:
Cˆg,t =
∑Ng,t
i=1 Cˆi,t∑Ng,t
i=1 EADi,t
. (19)
Loss ratio
We calculate the loss ratio given by
Lg = 4 ·
∑Ng,t
i=1 EADi,tLGDg,t ·Di,t∑Ng,t
i=1 EADi,t
, (20)
where Di,t is the default indicator in Equation (7). Note that a quarterly loss is annualized
by multiplying the quarterly loss ratio by the annualizing factor 4.
Figure 12 plots the Basel regulatory capital ratio, implied capital ratios and the loss ratio
per risk class. The Basel capital exceeds the realized losses for all risk classes and all years.
Thus, the regulatory assumptio of 15% for the asset correlation is suﬃcient to cover unexpected
losses. However the regulatory approach may not be eﬃcient. The empirical results may also
support lower asset correlations, which are increasing with risk. Insuﬃcient capital allocations
are possible for sub-segments, or alternatively, if the PD model is not updated over time. Our
model-implied capital ratios were able to provide a suﬃcient level of capital except for selected
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periods during the GFC when the increase in loss risk outweighted past experience.
[Figure 12 about here.]
5 Conclusion and imlications on prudential regulation
Credit portfolio losses and therefore bank capital are substantially aﬀected by the exposure
to systematic and non-systematic risks. This paper estimates PDs, total risk, systematic risk
and non-systematic risk of mortgage exposures and analyzes the empirical relationship between
these measures.
We ﬁnd that the sum of systematic risk and non-systematic risk follows a smile shape. The
decomposition of total risk into systematic and non-systematic risk shows that systematic risk
increases and non-systematic risk decreases as the unconditional PD of mortgages increases.
This implies a higher sensitivity of high PD loans to changes in the economy.
By extending the estimation period from 2006 to 2012, this paper also investigates the
serial changes of total, systematic and non-systematic risks during the GFC and thereafter.
The sub-prime crisis raises the total risk for all mortgages. However, the increase of total risk
is mainly caused by non-systematic risk for mortgages in the lowest risk class and systematic
risk for mortgages in other risk classes. The exposure to systematic risk increases permanently
while non-systematic risk increases temporarily. Finally, this paper evaluates regulatory capital
adequacy for mortgage exposures given the current regime of an asset correlation of 15% and
ﬁnds that the regulatory assumption on asset correlation is suﬃcient to cover unexpected loss.
A model-implied (and data-implied) regulatory capital approach may warrant a more eﬀective
capital allocation provided that PD models are periodically updated and that the time-lagged
realizations of systematic risk and non-systematic risk are taken into account.
This paper also emphasizes an important role of the length of historical data for regulatory
capital estimation. Basel (2006) proposes at least 5 years of data to estimate loss characteristics
such as EAD, PD and LGD. We start with a slightly longer time series and demonstrate the
change of parameter estimates during and after the GFC by sequentially updating our models
for extended time periods. In particular, risk measures are more sensitive than unconditional
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PDs to the duration of data in the presence of business cycles.
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Table 1: Frequency counts of origination and observation year
This table shows the number of mortgages (N), the number of defaults (D) and the default rates (D/N) per origina-
tion and observation year. The origination year of mortgages issued before 1990 is replaced by 1990 for mapping to
macroeconomic variables such as the Case-Shiller Index and debt-to-income ratio.
Origination Year Observation Year
Year N D D/N N D D/N
1990 82,309 364 0.0044
1991 4,840 40 0.0083
1992 9,729 61 0.0063
1993 24,089 166 0.0069
1994 26,713 197 0.0074
1995 45,714 415 0.0091
1996 65,106 467 0.0072
1997 527,899 1,335 0.0025
1998 1,173,231 3,060 0.0026
1999 934,544 6,109 0.0065
2000 779,823 14,843 0.0190 140,200 2,189 0.0156
2001 633,570 9,403 0.0148 696,465 5,227 0.0075
2002 1,528,595 21,587 0.0141 695,448 5,757 0.0083
2003 4,910,205 34,887 0.0071 935,247 7,527 0.0080
2004 10,061,555 102,124 0.0101 2,077,628 12,955 0.0062
2005 14,871,698 263,433 0.0177 4,533,915 31,160 0.0069
2006 16,748,786 532,468 0.0318 7,783,329 77,033 0.0099
2007 4,129,991 143,669 0.0348 10,281,593 193,035 0.0188
2008 381,460 8,505 0.0223 9,046,203 282,476 0.0312
2009 2,906 61 0.0210 6,946,571 247,213 0.0356
2010 382 - 0.0000 5,487,139 130,573 0.0238
2011 1,352 - 0.0000 4,551,755 92,789 0.0204
2012 2,119 34 0.0160 3,771,123 55,294 0.0147
Total 56,946,616 1,143,228 0.0201 56,946,616 1,143,228 0.0201
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Table 6: Parameter estimates of the asset value return, estimation period 2000-
2012
This table exhibits the parameter estimates of the asset value return in Equation (5) for the estimation period 2000 to
2012. The estimates are reversed back from the parameter estimates in Table 5 using the associated parametrization to
the Measurement Equation (13) of the state space model. The standard errors in the parentheses are calculated by the
delta method.
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Class 8 Class 9 Class 10
pg 0.0012 0.0035 0.0065 0.0099 0.0137 0.0169 0.0206 0.0240 0.0274 0.0389
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0056)
ρg 0.0016 0.0068 0.0086 0.0110 0.0130 0.0156 0.0167 0.0144 0.0154 0.0175
(0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0067) (0.0073) (0.0083)
αg 0.0482 0.0147 0.0138 0.0066 0.0035 0.0012 0.0006 0.0008 0.0017 0.0106
(0.0097) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0066)
σg 0.0497 0.0213 0.0223 0.0175 0.0165 0.0168 0.0173 0.0152 0.0171 0.0279
(0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0067) (0.0073) (0.0083)
α˜g 0.0482 0.0146 0.0137 0.0066 0.0035 0.0012 0.0006 0.0008 0.0016 0.0104
(0.0097) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0065)
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Table 7: Eﬀectiveness of default prediction
This table presents the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (AUROC) of the Probit model at
the estimation time applied to mortgages at the prediction years to measure the prediction accuracy of defaults. For
example, 70.92% of AUROC in the estimation year 2006 and the prediction year 2007 is obtained by applying the Probit
model at 2006:Q4 in Table 4 to mortgages in the prediction year 2007 with updated observation time variables. The
higher the AUROC, the more accurate the default prediction model.
Estimation Year
Prediction Year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2006 0.7092 0.6736 0.6272 0.6151 0.6096 0.6258
2007 . 0.6958 0.6523 0.6309 0.6237 0.6446
2008 . . 0.6578 0.6307 0.6227 0.6311
2009 . . . 0.6337 0.6251 0.6328
2010 . . . . 0.6278 0.6325
2011 . . . . . 0.6363
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Figure 1: Default rate and loss ratio
This ﬁgure plots the aggregate default rate of the total portfolio and the loss ratio given default calculated as the
aggregated loss over the aggregate outstanding balance at the observation time, i.e.,∑Nt
i=1 CBi,t ·Di,t · LGDi,t∑Nt
i=1 CBi
,
where CBi,t, Di,t and LGDi,t denote the current balance, the default indicator and the loss-given-default ratio for the
mortgage i at time t, respectively. The grey bars indicate years which include a period of economic downturn as indicated
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Figure 2: Case-Shiller index and debt-to-income ratio
This ﬁgure shows the historical the US 10-city composite Case-Shiller Index on the left vertical axis and the country-level
debt-to-income ratio from the Federal Reserve Bank on the right vertical axis. The higher the Case-Shiller Index, the
higher average house price.
39
Figure 3: Receiver Operating Characteristic curve per estimation period
This ﬁgure shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve is a common performance measure
for ordinal rating systems. The plot displays the true positives (sensitivity) and the false positives (one minus the
speciﬁcity). The better a ranking/rating system is able to attribute non-default outcomes with lower ranks and default
outcomes with higher ranks, the larger the area under the curve (AUROC, see Agresti, 1984).
Figure 4: Default rate per risk class and the estimated systematic risk factor,
estimation period 2000-2012
Figure (a) displays the historical default rates of ten risk classes based on the estimated PD from the Probit model with
the estimation period spanning from 2000 to 2012. Figure (b) shows the estimated systematic risk factor and its 95%
conﬁdence interval from Kalman ﬁltering given on the parameter estimates in Table 5. Note that the systematic risk
factor in Figure (a) was multiplied by minus one to show the co-movement with default rates of Figure (a).
(a) Class-wide default rate (b) Estimated systematic risk factor
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Figure 5: Total risk per risk class, estimation period 2000-2012
This ﬁgure displays the estimated total risk from the state space model in Table 6 and the Vasicek model. The default
rate per risk class is on the x-axis.
Figure 6: The volatility of default rate per risk class based on Gordy (2000),
estimation period 2000-2012
The ﬁgure presents the variance of default probability in Equation (16) as shown in Gordy (2000). The variance is
obtained by var (pg (ft) |pg , σg ) for the state space model and var (pg (ft) |pg , ρ˜g ) for the Vasicek model. The default
rate per risk class is on the x-axis.
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Figure 7: Systematic and non-systematic risks per risk class, estimation period
2000-2012
This ﬁgure presents the estimated systematic (ρg) and non-systematic (α˜g) risks from the state space model per risk
class. The average default rate per risk class is on the x-axis.
Figure 8: Serial change of unconditional PD and total risk per risk class
Figure (a) plots the estimated unconditional PD and Figure (b) plots the total risk (σg) as the end of estimation period
extends from 2006 to 2012 per risk class. The end year of the estimation periods is on the x-axis.
(a) Unconditional PD (b) Total risk
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Figure 9: Serial change of systematic and non-systematic risks per risk class
Figure (a) plots the estimated systematic (ρg) and Figure (b) plots the non-systematic (α˜g) risks as the end of estimation
period extends from 2006 to 2012 per risk class. The end year of the estimation periods is on the x-axis.
(a) Systematic risk (b) Non-systematic risk
Figure 10: Realized default rate vs. predicted unconditional PD per risk class
and estimation period
This ﬁgure compares the average default rate (y-axis) with the class-wide unconditional PD estimates (Φ (φ0,g)) from
the state space model (x-axis) for diﬀerent estimation periods. For example, the unconditional PDs for year 2006 are
obtained by the state space model with the estimation period from 2000 to 2006. Each line represents the pairs of the
average default rate and the class-wide unconditional PD for ten risk classes at the ﬁrst quarter of the last year in each
estimation period.
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Figure 11: Realized default rate vs. predicted PD, estimation period 2000-2008
This ﬁgure plots the quarter-ahead predicted class-wide PDs using the state space model at the estimation time horizon
spanning from 2000:Q2 to 2008:Q4. The PDs are predicted for 2008:Q1 at 2007:Q4 across ten risk classes as an example.
The unconditional PD denotes the unconditional mean of the state space model (Φ (φ0,g)) as in Figure 10, the conditional
forecast PD is obtained by
rˆg,t+1|t = Φ
(
φ0,g + φ1,gβf fˆt−1 + φ2,gβg zˆg,t−1
)
for g = 1, 2, · · · , 10, and the conditional PD is calculated by
rˆg,t|t = Φ
(
φ0,g + φ1,g fˆt + φ2,g zˆg,t
)
,
where fˆt−1, fˆt, zˆg,t−1 and zˆg,t are the Kalman ﬁltered risk factors at time t− 1 and t, respectively. The average default
rate per risk class is on the y-axis.
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Figure 12: Basel capital ratio, implied capital ratios and actual loss ratio
The ﬁgures present the actual loss ratio in (20), the Basel capital ratio(17) based on the assumption of asset correlation
15% and the implied capital ratios in (18) and (19).
(a) Class 1 (b) Class 2
(c) Class 3 (d) Class 4
(e) Class 5 (f) Class 6
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(g) Class 7 (h) Class 8
(i) Class 9 (j) Class 10
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